1.. Introduction {#s1}
================

On 31 December 2019, a cluster of 41 pneumonia cases of unknown aetiology in Wuhan, China, were reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). Subsequently, a novel coronavirus of zoonotic origin, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2; initially named as 2019-nCoV), was isolated from the patients \[[@RSOS200636C1]--[@RSOS200636C3]\]. The virus has spread to more than 200 countries and territories resulting in global coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic \[[@RSOS200636C4]\]. The rapid spread of the virus is partially attributed to the transmission by asymptomatic carriers or mildly symptomatic cases \[[@RSOS200636C5],[@RSOS200636C6]\]. Early diagnostic testing is an important tool for policy-makers to make public health decisions to contain the outbreak.

The virus from the patients was identified and sequenced early in the outbreak \[[@RSOS200636C1],[@RSOS200636C7]\] and resulted in the development of several polymerase chain reaction (PCR) detection protocols by multiple national organizations that were published by the WHO \[[@RSOS200636C8]\]. In addition, several other methods have been developed and published in the literature recently \[[@RSOS200636C5],[@RSOS200636C7],[@RSOS200636C9]--[@RSOS200636C15]\]. However, the molecular diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 may be jeopardized by potential preanalytical and analytical vulnerabilities including lack of harmonization of primers and probes \[[@RSOS200636C16]\]. Given the potential for the viruses to mutate, genetic variations in the viral genome at primer/probe binding regions can result in potential mismatches and false-negative results \[[@RSOS200636C17]\]. For example, primer and template mismatches have been reported to impede proper diagnosis of several viruses including influenza virus \[[@RSOS200636C18]--[@RSOS200636C21]\], respiratory syncytial virus \[[@RSOS200636C22]\], dengue virus \[[@RSOS200636C23]\], rabies virus \[[@RSOS200636C24]\], human immunodeficiency virus-1 \[[@RSOS200636C25],[@RSOS200636C26]\] and hepatitis B virus \[[@RSOS200636C27],[@RSOS200636C28]\].

SARS-CoV-2 is an enveloped positive-strand RNA virus classified as a member of family *Coronaviridae* in the genus *Betacoronavirus* along with SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV \[[@RSOS200636C29]\]. The sequence analysis of SARS-CoV-2 isolates has shown that its single-stranded RNA genome is approximately 30 kb in size \[[@RSOS200636C1],[@RSOS200636C7],[@RSOS200636C30]\]. Based on similarity with SARS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2 genome has been predicted to encode at least 10 open reading frames (ORFs) for structural and accessory proteins. As per current annotation (NC_045512.2), these viral ORFs encode replicase ORF1ab, spike (S), envelope (E), membrane (M) and nucleocapsid (N), and at least six accessory proteins (3a, 6, 7a, 7b, 8 and 10) \[[@RSOS200636C31]\].

Human coronaviruses encode a proofreading exoribonuclease, nsp14-ExoN, for maintaining replication fidelity and thus have a relatively slower mutation rate than other RNA viruses \[[@RSOS200636C32],[@RSOS200636C33]\]. SARS-CoV-2 encodes nsp14-ExoN as well \[[@RSOS200636C1]\], but mutations have been described in the genome for circulating SARS-CoV-2 \[[@RSOS200636C34]--[@RSOS200636C38]\]. Some laboratories have performed the alignment of diagnostic primers/probes with a limited number of viral sequences and have reported some mismatches \[[@RSOS200636C39],[@RSOS200636C40]\] which may lead to false-negative results \[[@RSOS200636C41]\]. The use of several commercially developed diagnostic assays has also been permitted around the world with limited regulatory approval due to the pandemic emergency \[[@RSOS200636C42]\]. However, the limit of detection of these assays differs considerably and can also lead to false-negative results \[[@RSOS200636C43]\]. As there are already reports of false-negative diagnosis of COVID-19 \[[@RSOS200636C44]--[@RSOS200636C48]\], there is a need for verification of potential primer/probe mismatch with the sequences of viral isolates being isolated from around the world. The American Society for Microbiology COVID-19 International Summit held on 23 March 2020 recommended routine verification of sequence mutations in primer and probe binding regions of the viral genome for optimal virus detection \[[@RSOS200636C49]\].

The objective of this study is the *in silico* reassessment of previously published PCR primers/probes for COVID-19 diagnosis. This was performed through the evaluation of the sequence variability within the primer/probe target regions of SARS-CoV-2 viral isolates from around the world. The absence of any mutations and mismatches in target regions of the assay used would provide a higher degree of confidence in the test results obtained while the presence of mutations could help guide the strategies for the reassessment of diagnostic assays. We believe that these findings provide potentially important information for clinicians, laboratory professionals and policy-makers.

2.. Methods {#s2}
===========

This study was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF); the accepted Stage 1 registration can be viewed at (<https://osf.io/ym8gc>). Minor deviations from protocol are identified in footnotes. The study design planner is included in [table 1](#RSOS200636TB1){ref-type="table"}. The summary of the sequence tracing pipeline is shown in [figure 1](#RSOS200636F1){ref-type="fig"}. Figure 1.Sequence tracing pipeline used in the study. \*The direction can be adjusted by selecting the option 'Adjust direction according to the first sequence', if needed. ^†^The change was made with editorial approval after Stage 1. Table 1.Study design planner.questionhypothesissampling plan (e.g. power analysis)analysis planinterpretation given different outcomesobtained results and interpretationare there any mutations in the primer/probe binding regions of the SARS-CoV-2 genome for PCR assays published in the literature?as the virus can potentially mutate during the outbreak, mutations in the primer/probe binding regions can result in mismatches with primer/probe template17 026 viral isolates would be downloaded from GISAID EpiCov database\
*inclusion criteria:*\
only full length (\>29 000 bp)\
*exclusion criteria:*\
the sequences with stretches of NNNs, ambiguous sequences, and missing sequences in the region of interest (ROI) will be considered low quality and would be excludedsequences would be aligned using MAFFT\
low-quality sequences would be excluded from the alignment and sequence variability would be traced *in silico* using SequenceTracer\
the highly variable region, if any, would be further analysed for nucleotide composition at each position using positional nucleotide numerical summary (PNNS)\
the complete genome of Wuhan-Hu-1 from the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) would act as a positive control (NCBI Reference Sequence: NC_045512.2)in the event of a negative result, it would be concluded that there is no evidence of a difference between primer/probe and viral isolates\
this would serve as a reference for researchers and laboratory professionals using PCR assays for the detection of SARS-CoV-2the analysis showed the presence of mismatches/mutations in primer/probe binding regions of 7 assays out of 27 assays studied

2.1.. Selection of primers and probes {#s2a}
-------------------------------------

A total of 27 PCR primer-probe sets were selected based on literature review \[[@RSOS200636C9],[@RSOS200636C10],[@RSOS200636C12]--[@RSOS200636C15],[@RSOS200636C50]--[@RSOS200636C52]\] and on the assays posted on WHO website \[[@RSOS200636C8]\] originally developed by seven different national institutions including Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), China; Institut Pasteur, Paris, France; US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), USA; National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan; Charité -- Universitätsmedizin Berlin Institute of Virology, Germany; The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and National Institute of Health, Thailand.

2.2.. Sequencing data {#s2b}
---------------------

The complete genome sequences of the virus were downloaded from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) EpiCoV database \[[@RSOS200636C53]\]. As of 7 May 2020, it hosted a total of 17 175 SARS-CoV-2 sequences isolated from humans. By applying the complete genome (greater than 29 000 bp) filter, a total of 17 026 sequences were included in the study that are available upon free registration (<https://www.gisaid.org/>). SARS-CoV-2 is an RNA virus, but the data are shown in DNA format as per scientific convention. The sequences are shared by the laboratories around the world and a list of accession numbers is included in electronic supplementary material, file S1. It is recognized that this study is not immune to the geographical bias present in academic and scientific research. As the data were sampled from a global sequence database, it is possible that data may originate from high-income countries like the literature in other disciplines \[[@RSOS200636C54],[@RSOS200636C55]\]. In addition, it is possible that data from certain countries or regions are excluded based on the exclusion criteria of low-quality data that may skew the data geographically. Another reason for possible data skew may be the origin of the current pandemic being China. Indeed, a recent study analysed the publications in COVID-19 literature hub LitCovid \[[@RSOS200636C56]\] and observed that more than 30% of articles were related to China \[[@RSOS200636C57]\]. These aspects of possible bias and data skew are addressed in the Discussion to make sure that the valid conclusions are drawn from the data in terms of geographical correlation.

2.3.. Multiple sequence alignment and alignment processing {#s2c}
----------------------------------------------------------

Multiple sequence alignment (MSA) was performed using MAFFT (Multiple Alignment with Fast Fourier Transform) program v. 7 dedicated to closely related viral genomes \[[@RSOS200636C58],[@RSOS200636C59]\] available online (<https://mafft.cbrc.jp/alignment/server/>). The complete genome of Wuhan-Hu-1 downloaded from NCBI on 7 May 2020 was included as a reference, which is 29 903 bp long (NCBI Reference Sequence: NC_045512.2). The aligned sequences were downloaded in PIR format. Each primer/probe was aligned with the MSA and the binding region referred to here as region of interest (ROI) was inspected using the AliView program 1.26 \[[@RSOS200636C60]\]. To evaluate the sequence variability in target regions of previously published primers/probes, the ROI for each primer/probe set was saved as a separate file in FASTA format.

2.4.. Sequence variation in primer/probe binding regions in SARS-CoV-2 genome {#s2d}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The MSA sequence for forward primer, probe and reverse primer were stratified using the SequenceTracer module (<http://entropy.szu.cz:8080/EntropyCalcWeb/sequences>) of the Alignment Explorer \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. This tool segregated sequences into discrete groups of identical sequence variants along with their frequency for each primer/probe. The sequences with stretches of NNNs, ambiguous sequences in ROI and missing sequences^[1](#FN1){ref-type="fn"}^ were excluded from the study. Subsequently, a threshold^[2](#FN2){ref-type="fn"}^ (0.5% of all sequences included) was defined to remove extremely low prevalent variants and sequencing errors in the data as described previously \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. Thus, only the sequence variants with at least 0.5% incidence were further considered. The viral isolates were reported as the frequency of hits with perfect primer match and hits with mismatches along with a summary of mutated nucleotides for each primer/probe. The distribution of the sequence variants in three primers/probes with the highest frequency of mismatches were analysed geographically. As the sequence variation was moderate, the base composition of each nucleotide position was not analysed. As noted in the registered Stage 1 protocol (<https://osf.io/ym8gc>), this analysis can be performed using the positional nucleotide numerical summary (PNNS) calculator (<http://entropy.szu.cz:8080/EntropyCalcWeb/pnns>) of the Alignment Explorer \[[@RSOS200636C61]\].

3.. Results {#s3}
===========

The sequence tracing pipeline ([figure 1](#RSOS200636F1){ref-type="fig"}) was applied to the comprehensive sequence dataset of 17 027 SARS-CoV-2 sequences for each PCR primer/probe. To determine the sequence variability in the primer/probe binding regions, all the sequences in the dataset were aligned using MAFFT. Next, for each PCR assay, the MSA file was trimmed to include only the primer or probe binding regions referred to here as ROI. The sequence file for each primer/probe was submitted to SequenceTracer to segregate into discrete groups of identical sequence variants and presented a detailed view of the nucleotide variation in each ROI along with the frequency of each variant (figures [2](#RSOS200636F2){ref-type="fig"} and [3](#RSOS200636F3){ref-type="fig"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). All the sequences showing ambiguous sequences were grouped as 'outgroup1', short sequences were grouped as 'outgroup2' and missing sequences were grouped as 'excluded'. These three groups were not included in the analysis (collectively referred here as 'removed'), and the number of 'informative' sequences was calculated by subtracting these three groups from the total number of sequences. The informative group was then divided into hits with a perfect match and hits with mismatches for each primer and probe ([table 2](#RSOS200636TB2){ref-type="table"}). It is not surprising that most primer/probe binding regions show mutations/mismatches with at least a couple of sequences but some of those may be extremely low prevalent variants and sequencing errors in the data. To minimize the effect of such sequences on the analysis, a threshold of 0.5% was then defined where only the sequence variants with at least 0.5% incidence were further considered as described previously \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. The frequency of the sequences with the perfect match and with mismatches was then calculated from sequences above the threshold for each primer and probe. The summary of the analysis for 27 assays is presented in [table 2](#RSOS200636TB2){ref-type="table"}. Figure 2.Sequence variants in primers and probe binding regions for CN-CDC-N (*a*) and Charité-ORF1b (*b*): sequence variants in 17 026 viral genome sequences aligned to the primer/probe binding regions (5′ → 3′) along with the number of sequence variants and the frequency of each variant in descending order. The dots indicate an identical nucleotide. The horizontal double bar indicates the threshold (greater than or equal to 0.5%). The binding region of reverse primer is reverse complemented. As an example, the removed and informative sequences are indicated with vertical bars. outgroup1, ambiguous sequences; outgroup2, short sequences. Figure 3.Sequence variants in primers and probe binding regions for US-CDC-N-1 (*a*) and US-CDC-N-3 (*b*): sequence variants in 17 026 viral genome sequences aligned to the primer/probe binding regions (5′→ 3′) along with the number of sequence variants and the frequency of each variant in descending order. The dots indicate an identical nucleotide. The horizontal double bar indicates the threshold (greater than or equal to 0.5%). The binding region of reverse primer is reverse complemented. outgroup1, ambiguous sequences; outgroup2, short sequences; excluded. Table 2.Reassesment of 27 published PCR diagnostic assays using 17 027 SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences.gene targetassay name^a^countryF/P/R^b^sequence (5\'--3′)position^c^total number of sequencesabove threshold (≥0.5%)^d^reference(s)removedinformativeperfect matchwith mismatchestotalperfect match (%)with mismatches (%)ORF1abYip-ORF1abChinaFATGCATTTGCATCAGAGGCT1866--\>18858516 94216 9113116 911100\[[@RSOS200636C14]\]RTTGTTATAGCGGCCTTCTGT1970\<--195116816 85916 855416 855100Pasteur-ORF1ab-1FranceFATGAGCTTAGTCCTGTTG12 690--\>12 7075416 97316 973016 973100\[[@RSOS200636C8]\]PAGATGTCTTGTGCTGCCGGTA12 717--\>12 7372517 00216 997516 997100RCTCCCTTTGTTGTGTTGT12 797\<--12 7802816 99916 9455416 945100Pasteur-ORF1ab-2FranceFGGTAACTGGTATGATTTCG14 080--\>14 0984616 98116 981016 981100\[[@RSOS200636C8]\]PTCATACAAACCACGCCAGG14 105--\>14 1234516 98216 9582416 958100RCTGGTCAAGGTTAATATAGG14 186\<--14 1675016 97716 9393816 939100CN-CDC-ORF1abChinaFCCCTGTGGGTTTTACACTTAA13 342--\>13 3624016 98716 9771016 977100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C12]\]PCCGTCTGCGGTATGTGGAAAGGTTATGG13 377--\>13 404105915 96815 9056315 905100RACGATTGTGCATCAGCTGA13 460\<--13 442103715 99015 9781215 978100Young-ORF1abSingaporeFTCATTGTTAATGCCTATATTAACC14 155--\>14 1785116 97616 969716 969100\[[@RSOS200636C15]\]PAACTGCAGAGTCACATGTTGACA14 193--\>14 2156716 96016 9392116 939100RCACTTAATGTAAGGCTTTGTTAAG14 243\<--14 2202517 00216 9831916 983100Charité-ORF1bGermanyFGTGARATGGTCATGTGTGGCGG15 431--\>15 4527116 95616 9084816 908100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C50]\]PCAGGTGGAACCTCATCAGGAGATGC15 470--\>15 4944316 98416 976816 976100RCARATGTTAAASACACTATTAGCATA15 530\<--15 5052317 004017 00417 0020.0100Won-ORF1abSouth KoreaFCATGTGTGGCGGTTCACTAT15 441--\>15 4604516 98216 9721016 972100\[[@RSOS200636C13]\]RTGCATTAACATTGGCCGTGA15 558\<-15 5392916 99816 9316716 931100Chan-ORF1abChinaFCGCATACAGTCTTRCAGGCT16 220--\>16 2396916 95816 9461216 946100\[[@RSOS200636C9]\]PTTAAGATGTGGTGCTTGCATACGTAGAC16 276--\>16 3038416 94316 78615716 93099.10.9RGTGTGATGTTGAWATGACATGGTC16 353\<--16 3308616 941016 94116 9320.0100HKU-ORF1bHong KongFTGGGGYTTTACRGGTAACCT18 778--\>18 7976116 96616 9323416 932100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C52]\]PTAGTTGTGATGCWATCATGACTAG18 849--\>18 8724116 98616 9761016 976100RAACRCGCTTAACAAAGCACTC18 909\<--18 8894816 97916 9582116 958100SYoung-SSingaporeFTATACATGTCTCTGGGACCA21 763--\>21 7829116 93616 9072916 907100\[[@RSOS200636C15]\]PCTAAGAGGTTTGATAACCCTGTCCTACC21 789--\>21 8169016 93716 9102716 910100RATCCAGCCTCTTATTATGTTAGAC21 876\<--21 8539916 92816 9072116 907100Chan-SChinaFCCTACTAAATTAAATGATCTCTGCTTTACT22 712--\>22 74125416 77316 768516 768100\[[@RSOS200636C9]\]PCGCTCCAGGGCAAACTGGAAAG22 792--\>22 81326216 76516 7521316 752100RCAAGCTATAACGCAGCCTGTA22 869\<---22 8496516 96216 956616 956100Won-SSouth KoreaFCTACATGCACCAGCAACTGT23 114-\>23 13387216 15516 1262916 126100\[[@RSOS200636C13]\]RCACCTGTGCCTGTTAAACCA23 213\<--23 1942916 99816 9871116 987100EWon-ESouth KoreaFTTCGGAAGAGACAGGTACGTT26 259--\>26 2793316 99416 986816 986100\[[@RSOS200636C13]\]RCACACAATCGATGCGCAGTA26 365\<--26 3468316 94416 938616 938100Charité-EGermanyFACAGGTACGTTAATAGTTAATAGCGT26 269--\>26 2944716 98016 975516 975100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C50]\]PACACTAGCCATCCTTACTGCGCTTCG26 332--\>26 3577516 95216 9282416 928100RATATTGCAGCAGTACGCACACA26 381\<--26 3608916 93816 9281016 928100Huang-EChinaFACTTCTTTTTCTTGCTTTCGTGGT26 295--\>26 3188016 94716 9252216 925100\[[@RSOS200636C10]\]PCTAGTTACACTAGCCATCCTTACTGC26 326--\>26 3518116 94616 9202616 920100RGCAGCAGTACGCACACAATC26 376\<--26 3579016 93716 928916 928100Niu-EChinaFTTCTTGCTTTCGTGGTATTC26 303--\>26 3227816 94916 9262316 926100\[[@RSOS200636C12]\]PGTTACACTAGCCATCCTTACTGCGCTTCGA26 329--\>26 3588216 94516 9212416 921100RCACGTTAACAATATTGCAGC26 391\<--26 37211116 91616 911516 911100NCN-CDC-NChinaFGGGGAACTTCTCCTGCTAGAAT28 881--\>28 90217016 85713 533332416 66281.218.8\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C12]\]PTTGCTGCTGCTTGACAGATT28 934--\>28 9538516 94216 939316 939100RCAGACATTTTGCTCTCAAGCTG28 979\<--28 9589216 93516 9053016 905100NIH-TH_NThailandFCGTTTGGTGGACCCTCAGAT28 320--\>28 3395216 97516 8938216 893100\[[@RSOS200636C8]\]PCAACTGGCAGTAACCA28 341--\>28 3564216 98516 9463916 946100RCCCCACTGCGTTCTCCATT28 376\<--28 3585216 97516 9383716 938100US-CDC-N-1USFGACCCCAAAATCAGCGAAAT28 287--\>28 3064016 98716 9701716 970100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C62]\]PACCCCGCATTACGTTTGGTGGACC28 309--\>28 3327216 95516 64730816 92098.41.6R TCTGGTTACTGCCAGTTGAATCTG28 358\<--28 3354816 97916 87610316 876100US-CDC-N-2USFTTACAAACATTGGCCGCAAA29 164--\>29 18333916 68816 6474116 647100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C62]\]PACAATTTGCCCCCAGCGCTTCAG29 188--\>29 21035116 67616 6057116 605100RGCGCGACATTCCGAAGAA29 230\<--29 21333416 69316 6771616 677100US-CDC-N-3USFGGGAGCCTTGAATACACCAAAA28 681--\>28 7026316 96416 74721716 94398.81.2\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C62]\]PAYCACATTGGCACCCGCAATCCTG28 704--\>28 7274116 98616 9226416 922100RTGTAGCACGATTGCAGCATTG28 752\<--28 7323416 99316 9524116 952100Young-NSingaporeFCTCAGTCCAAGATGGTATTTCT28 583--\>28 6046716 96016 953716 953100\[[@RSOS200636C15]\]PACCTAGGAACTGGCCCAGAAGCT28 608--\>28 6305816 969016 96916 9270.0100RAGCACCATAGGGAAGTCC28 648\<--28 6315216 97516 9492616 949100Corman-NGermanyFCACATTGGCACCCGCAATC28 706--\>28 7243816 98916 9543516 954100\[[@RSOS200636C50]\]PACTTCCTCAAGGAACAACATTGCCA28 754--\>28 7777516 95216 9302216 930100RGAGGAACGAGAAGAGGCTTG28 833\<--28 8149216 93516 8637216 863100Won-NSouth KoreaFCAATGCTGCAATCGTGCTAC28 732--\>28 7513316 99416 9534116 953100\[[@RSOS200636C13]\]RGTTGCGACTACGTGATGAGG28 849\<--28 8308516 94216 78815416 788100NIID-JP-NJapan JapanFAAATTTTGGGGACCAGGAAC29 125--\>29 14430116 72616 6586816 658100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C51]\]PATGTCGCGCATTGGCATGGA29 222--\>29 24132916 69816 6791916 679100RTGGCAGCTGTGTAGGTCAAC29 282\<--29 26330916 718016 71816 6870.0100R-v3TGGCACCTGTGTAGGTCAAC29 282\<--29 26330916 71816 6873116 687100\[[@RSOS200636C51]\]HKU-NHong KongFTAATCAGACAAGGAACTGATTA29 145--\>29 16630916 71816 6675116 667100\[[@RSOS200636C8],[@RSOS200636C52]\]PGCAAATTGTGCAATTTGCGG29 177\<--29 19634716 68016 6374316 637100RCGAAGGTGTGACTTCCATG29 254\<--29 23632016 70716 6683916 668100Chan-NChinaFGCGTTCTTCGGAATGTCG29 210--\>29 22733816 68916 6652416 665100\[[@RSOS200636C9]\]PAACGTGGTTGACCTACACAGST29 257--\>29 27831116 71616 6803616 680100RTTGGATCTTTGTCATCCAATTTG29 306\<--29 28430416 72316 6744916 674100[^2][^3][^4][^5]

It was observed that the primers/probe of 20 assays out of 27 assays tested showed a perfect match with the template at the defined threshold ([table 2](#RSOS200636TB2){ref-type="table"}). It was further observed that the forward primer of CN-CDC-N showed three nucleotide mismatches with 18.8% of viral sequences ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"} and [figure 2](#RSOS200636F2){ref-type="fig"}*a*). In addition, the US-CDC-N-1 probe and the US-CDC-N-3 forward primer showed one mismatch with 1.6% and 1.2% viral sequences, respectively ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"} and [figure 3](#RSOS200636F3){ref-type="fig"}). The reverse primer of NIID-JP-N also showed one mismatch with all the sequences ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). The probe of Chan-ORF1ab showed one mismatch with 0.9% of sequences while one mismatch in the reverse primer for all the sequences ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). One mismatch was also observed with all the sequences for the probe of Young-N ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). Most of the mismatches observed were not near the 3′ end of primers but some were in the probe binding regions. Many diagnostic assays have included degenerate nucleotides to increase the inclusivity of the assay for SARS-CoV and bat-SARS-related CoVs, but in certain cases, this is even detrimental for inclusive detection of SARS-CoV-2. For example, the Charité-ORF1b reverse primer contains an S (G or C) but all the viral sequences (in total 17 002) contain a T at this position ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"} and [figure 2](#RSOS200636F2){ref-type="fig"}*b*). Some of the other mutations observed in the primer/probe binding regions that did not pass the defined threshold include T13402G, C15540T, A28338G, C28846T, C28887T, C28896G, C29144T, T29148C and A29188T. Some of these are near the 3′ end of primers (figures [2](#RSOS200636F2){ref-type="fig"} and [3](#RSOS200636F3){ref-type="fig"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). Table 3.Summary of primer/probe mismatches with SARS-CoV-2 genome.primer nameF/P/R^b^sequence (5′--3′)^c^ and suggested adjustmentgenome position^d^nucleotidefrequencyprimergenomeCharité-ORF1bRCARATGTTAAA**[S]{.ul}**ACACTATTAGCATA\
Suggested modification from S to A (or R). CARATGTTAAA**[A]{.ul}**ACACTATTAGCATA15 519S (G/C)^1^T17 002/17 002\
(100%)Chan-ORF1abPTTAAGATGTGGTG**[C]{.ul}**TTGCATACGTAGAC16 289CT144/16 930\
(0.9%)R**[G]{.ul}**TGTGATGTTGAWATGACATGGTC\
Suggested modification from G to A\
**[A]{.ul}**TGTGATGTTGAWATGACATGGTC16 353C^a^T16 932/16 932\
(100%)CN-CDC-NF**[GGG]{.ul}**GAACTTCTCCTGCTAGAAT28 881\
28 882\
28 883GGGAAC3129/16 662\
(18.8%)US-CDC-N-1PAC**[C]{.ul}**CCGCATTACGTTTGGTGGACC29 311CT273/16 920\
(1.6%)US-CDC-N-3FGGGAGCC**[T]{.ul}**TGAATACACCAAAA28 688TC196/16 943\
(1.2%)Young-NPACCTAGGAACTGG**[C]{.ul}**CCAGAAGCT\
Suggested modification from C to G\
ACCTAGGAACTGG**[G]{.ul}**CCAGAAGCT28 621CG16 969/16 969\
(100%)NIID-JP-NRTGGCA**[G]{.ul}**CTGTGTAGGTCAAC\
Suggested modification from G to C \[[@RSOS200636C51]\]\
TGGCA**[C]{.ul}**CTGTGTAGGTCAAC29 277C^a^G16 687/16 687\
(100%)[^6][^7][^8][^9]

The majority of the sequences included in this study originated from Europe (9410) and North America (4759), while there were only 136 sequences from Africa, 7 from Central America and 142 from South America. The UK and the USA were among the countries with the highest number of sequences included ([figure 4](#RSOS200636F4){ref-type="fig"}*a*; electronic supplementary material, file S3). The geographical distribution of the CN-CDC-N forward primer, US-CDC-N-1 probe and US-CDC-N-3 forward primer mismatches showed that it is distributed globally. However, mismatches with the CN-CDC-N forward primer were mostly found in Europe, while mismatches with the US-CDC-N-1 probe and the US-CDC-N-3 forward primer were found mostly in Australia and Asia ([figure 4](#RSOS200636F4){ref-type="fig"}; electronic supplementary material, file S3). Figure 4.Geographical distribution of included sequences dataset (*a*) and mismatches for CN-CDC-N forward primer (*b*), US-CDC-N-1 probe (*c*) and US-CDC-N-3 forward primer (*d*). The total number of sequences in each dataset is given in parentheses. Data used to draw graphs are included in electronic supplementary material, file S3.

4.. Discussion {#s4}
==============

This study exhaustively evaluated the genetic diversity in the primer/probe binding regions of 27 previously published SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic assays including those recommended by WHO. The data presented in this study show mismatches in seven assays, highlighting the need for keeping the assay current through regular verification of sequence variation in PCR primer/probe binding regions. The other 20 assays show a perfect match with 100% of sequences at the defined threshold of 0.5%. This observation is in line with the estimates of the moderate mutation rate in the SARS-CoV-2 genome similar to the SARS-CoV genome \[[@RSOS200636C63],[@RSOS200636C64]\]. It has been estimated that the mutation rate in the genome of coronaviruses is less than other RNA viruses while much higher than DNA viruses and the host \[[@RSOS200636C65],[@RSOS200636C66]\]. Although all the sequences with mismatches were grouped in comparison to sequences with a perfect match, not all mismatches necessarily result in false-negative results. The effects of mismatch between primers/probes and template depend upon position and number of mismatches. Most of the mismatches observed in primers of SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic assays were not near the 3′ end and may be tolerated. Mismatches at the 3′ end are known for their deleterious effect on PCR amplification \[[@RSOS200636C17],[@RSOS200636C67],[@RSOS200636C68]\], but single mismatches, especially more than 5 bp far from the 3′ end, have a moderate effect on PCR amplification and are unlikely to significantly affect the assay performance \[[@RSOS200636C67]\]. Three assays showed a single nucleotide mismatch in the probe binding region. PCR amplification is more prone to mismatches in the probe region and even a single mismatch may reduce the sensitivity of the assay and lead to false-negative results due to the prevention of probe binding and subsequence fluorescence \[[@RSOS200636C22],[@RSOS200636C28],[@RSOS200636C69]--[@RSOS200636C71]\]. In the scenarios where mismatches were tolerated, one additional mutation resulted in reduced RT-qPCR sensitivity for the detection of influenza A virus \[[@RSOS200636C18]\].

Despite the ability of single mismatches to be tolerated, it is important to consider that mismatches need to be corrected if found in most of the viral sequences available. For example, the reverse primer of Charité-ORF1b shows a mismatch with all the viral sequences (a total of 17 002). This mismatch has also been observed in 990 viral sequences along with the lower sensitivity of this assay in a recent preprint \[[@RSOS200636C72]\]. Similarly, the NIID-JP-N reverse primer also shows a mismatch with all the sequences. This assay released by WHO was subsequently corrected by the authors in a separate study \[[@RSOS200636C51]\]. Although they show no difference in the performance of both assays, there is no apparent reason for not correcting the mismatch in the primer. The WHO recommended assays of SARS-CoV-2 were developed by multiple national organizations early in the outbreak with limited genomic sequence data available and have been instrumental for the diagnosis of COVID-19. However, some of the assays have not been reassessed in the light of the risk of mutations during viral evolution. Based on the analysis of 17 027 viral sequences, this study demonstrates the presence of mutations/mismatches in the primer/probe binding regions of some published assays ([table 3](#RSOS200636TB3){ref-type="table"}). Sequences adjustments to these primers/probes need to be assessed experimentally using viral strains or nucleic acid coupled with subsequent experimental performance using clinical samples. With increasing concern of false-negative COVID-19 diagnosis and poor sensitivity of diagnostic PCR in certain cases \[[@RSOS200636C73],[@RSOS200636C74]\], correcting the mismatches between primers/probes and template may help to improve the sensitivity of certain diagnostic assays.

There have been recent efforts along the same line where a limited number of viral sequences were aligned with primers/probes to search for mismatches. One of the recent preprints used 992 sequences to report some variants in the primer/probe binding regions \[[@RSOS200636C72]\]. However, many of the mismatches could be rare variants or sequencing errors, and variability in the assay binding regions should be assessed across a larger number of viral sequences. In addition, the diagnostic assay should not be revised based on the presence of rare variants in the population and thus a threshold of 0.5% was defined to eliminate such variants from the analysis. Some of the mismatches observed by this preprint were confirmed in the larger dataset of the current study. Other variants were not observed or did not reach the threshold and thus were not reported in the final analysis. It cannot be excluded that empirical threshold adjustment of this study might have missed some significant variants. For instance, choosing a threshold of 0.2% would have resulted in a mismatch with five additional assays that were reported to match with 100% of sequences in the current analysis. Another recent preprint reported a bioinformatics system named 'BioLaboro' to assess the efficacy of the existing PCR assays to detect pathogens as they evolve \[[@RSOS200636C75]\]. However, this system requires specialized software and large RAM hardware which is not generally available in regular diagnostic or research laboratories. By contrast, the current study validates a pipeline for *in silico* re-evaluation of PCR diagnostic assays of SARS-CoV-2. This approach has successfully been applied previously for influenza A virus \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. Using freely available open-source software, the analysis was performed on a regular desktop computer without any need for special hardware. The pipeline does not require extensive computational skills except for some sequence alignment skills. The pipeline can be applied to a SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic assay of choice.

Verification of *in silico* nucleotide identity match, termed as inclusivity analysis, is also a component of the performance criteria of COVID-19 diagnostic assays by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as well as the European Commission \[[@RSOS200636C76],[@RSOS200636C77]\]. Several commercially developed COVID-19 diagnostic assays have received limited regulatory approval due to the emergency situation. As of 12 May 2020, a total of 54 commercial diagnostic test kits including the one developed by the US-CDC have received emergency use authorization (EUA) from the FDA \[[@RSOS200636C78]\]. The CDC has also reported one nucleotide mismatch in the N1 forward primer in their inclusivity assay using sequences available as of 1 February 2020 \[[@RSOS200636C62]\]. Some commercial kits like BD BioGX use CDC primers and thus do not conduct independent inclusivity analysis \[[@RSOS200636C79]\]. Many other kits have reported the alignment of their assay primers/probes with a couple of hundred sequences \[[@RSOS200636C80]--[@RSOS200636C85]\]. As primer/probe identity for most commercial kits is not revealed, manufacturer-independent data are scarce. Recent comparisons of SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic assays have shown some discordance which may partially be due to sequence differences \[[@RSOS200636C86],[@RSOS200636C87]\]. Therefore, there is a need for comprehensive inclusivity assessment of commercial diagnostic assays. Although not addressed in this article, other factors for reassessment include *in silico* cross-reactivity with human genes, genes of other members of family Coronaviridae and other respiratory viruses/bacteria.

The methodology outlined here uses MSA of publicly available viral sequences and is prone to certain biases despite its general utility in diagnostic PCR assay design. One of the biases is the compositional bias, which may arise as a result of sampling from certain geographical locations due to access to better facilities for viral genome sequencing or location of the outbreak. Based on a relatively moderate mutation rate in the genome, the results obtained can be applied globally, but caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from the results for a specific region, especially with a smaller number of sequences included. Another possible geographical bias can arise due to the removal of data collected from certain countries or regions. However, the fact that less than 2.1% of sequences were removed for 73 out of 76 primers/probes studied mitigates this concern in the current study. The geographical analysis of the removed data (approx. 6%) of the remaining three primers/probes showed that most of the removed viral sequences were from Europe as expected (electronic supplementary material, file S4). Although the risk of data skew geographically cannot be ruled out completely, this much data exclusion is in line with previous reports \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. Another source of compositional bias may be the redundancy where the same viral strain is re-sequenced and re-submitted to the sequence database.

Another source of bias may arise from the submission of isolates after passaging in the cell culture as well as sequencing artefacts including ambiguous data, short artificial insertions or deletions, incorrect sequence directions, incorrect nucleotide insertions, short sequence stretches and sequence longer than standard length \[[@RSOS200636C88]\]. Most data in the EpiCov database include the full-length data, and thus short sequences were not included in the study. To remove artificially inserted sequences and sequences at the ends, if any, MSA was performed with the option to keep the alignment length according to the reference sequence. In this methodology, no gaps are inserted in the reference sequence and corresponding sites in the other sequences are deleted. Therefore, this methodology can potentially remove any real insertions as well. However, only seven insertions affecting 31 sequences are catalogued in CoV-GLUE database (<http://cov-glue.cvr.gla.ac.uk/#/insertion>) as of 22 May 2020 \[[@RSOS200636C89]\]. The use of SequenceTracer in the tracing pipeline successfully filters out ambiguous data and deletions \[[@RSOS200636C61]\]. As SequenceTracer removes all the sequences with short and missing sequences, a real deletion of a stretch of sequence would also be filtered out. However, only a few sequences were removed in the 'outgroup2' or in 'excluded' group (figures [2](#RSOS200636F2){ref-type="fig"} and [3](#RSOS200636F3){ref-type="fig"}; electronic supplementary material, file S2). In line, none of the deletions affecting more than two sequences listed in CoV-GLUE database (<http://cov-glue.cvr.gla.ac.uk/#/deletion>) as of 22 May 2020 were found in the ROI under study.

5.. Conclusion {#s5}
==============

This work outlines a comprehensive approach for the bioinformatics reassessment of PCR diagnostic assays for SARS-CoV-2. The application of this strategy on 27 previously developed assays using 17 027 viral sequences showed mutations/mismatches in primer/probe binding regions of seven assays. This information will act as a reference and may help re-evaluate COVID-19 diagnostic strategies. *In silico* analysis of primers/probes should be coupled with empirical testing on clinical samples and the primers/probes that work well *in silico* as well as empirically should be used in a diagnostic assay for SARS-CoV-2.
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SequenceTracer removes the missing sequences in ROI. The exclusion criterion of missing sequences was clarified with editorial approval after Stage 1 acceptance and prior to observation of the data.
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[^1]: Electronic supplementary material is available online at <https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.5012597>.

[^2]: ^a^The assays were named in the following format: organization/author-gene target.

[^3]: ^b^ Forward primer (F), probe (P) and reverse primer (R).

[^4]: ^c^ Positions shown are with reference to NC_045 512.2.

[^5]: ^d^A threshold of 0.5% was defined where only the sequence variants with greater than or equal to 0.5% incidence were further considered.

[^6]: ^a^Reverse-complemented.

[^7]: ^b^Forward primer (F), probe (P) and reverse primer (R).

[^8]: ^c^Underlined and bold sequences indicate the mismatch observed and the suggested adjustment.

[^9]: ^d^Positions shown are with reference to NC_045512.2.
